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THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Milena Sterio* 
Abstract: Globalization, characterized by the inter-connectivity of per-
sons, states, and non-state actors on a global plane, has led to the devel-
opment of binding international law across several legal fields, namely, 
international human rights, international criminal law, and private in-
ternational law. This Article explores the proliferation of actors, norms, 
and organizations, as well as the expansion of international jurisdiction 
that has underscored the development of international law over the last 
half century. The Article focuses on the impact of globalized interna-
tional law on state actors, as well as on individuals, by reshaping their 
behavior in the international realm. In particular, this Article assesses 
the role that globalized international law plays in specific legal fields, 
drawing comparisons and suggesting what the future might hold for 
such fields of law. 
Introduction 
 Globalization, a phenomenon that can be described as inter-
connectivity between regions, peoples, ethnic, social, cultural, and com-
mercial interests across the globe, has affected different legal fields, in-
cluding international law.1 Reshaped by the potent forces of globaliza-
                                                                                                                      
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. J.D., Cornell Law 
School, magna cum laude, 2002; Maitrise en Droit (French law degree), Université Paris I-
Panthéon-Sorbonne, cum laude, 2002; D.E.A. (master’s degree), Private International Law, 
Université Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, cum laude, 2003; B.A., Rutgers University, French 
Literature and Political Science, summa cum laude, 1998. The author would like to thank 
Ekaterina Zabalueva for her excellent research assistance and input with this Article. 
1 Many scholars have attempted to define globalization. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, 
From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 Colum. J. Transat’l L. 485, 490 n.11 
(2005); Philippe Sands, Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33 
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 527, 537–38 (2001); see also infra Part II (discussing “globaliza-
tion” of three areas of international law). Legal scholars also refer to globalization, for 
example, by calling for a broader frame of analysis entitled “law and globalization.” See 
Berman, supra, at 490–92. 
The term “globalization,” moreover, has been used in many different fields besides 
law, such as anthropology and sociology. For example, anthropologists have argued that we 
live in the “global cultural ecumene” or a “world of creolization.” See Robert J. Foster, Mak-
ing National Cultures in the Global Ecumene, 20 Ann. Rev. Anthropology 235, 236 (1991); 
Ulf Hannerz, Notes on the Global Ecumene, Pub. Culture, Spring 1989, at 66; Ulf Hannerz, 
The World in Creolisation, 57 Afr. 546, 551–52 (1987). Sociologists, similarly, have shifted 
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tion, international law has transformed itself from a set of legal rules 
governing inter-state relations, to a complex web of transnational docu-
ments, providing a normative framework for all sorts of different actors 
on the international legal scene.2 Phenomena that used to belong to 
domestic realms are now examined and monitored through the interna-
tional legal lens.3 Our planet is “shrinking” because issues such as the 
environment, nuclear weapons, disease, and terrorism have become of 
global concern, and are thus measured by international law parameters.4 
Domestic law has lost its omnipotent, “sovereign” power and is now sup-
plemented, corrected, and watched over by international law.5 Thus, in-
ternational law has undergone an evolutionary process over recent dec-
ades, transforming itself from an instrument of inter-state conflict resolu-
tion, to a powerful global tool, present in everyday life and influential in 
many state actors’ and non-state entities’ decisions and policies. 
 This Article examines the evolution of international law brought 
about by the impact of globalization, as well as the role that globalized 
international law plays in different legal fields, and the impact that it as-
serts on state and non-state actors. First, this Article describes the trans-
formation of international law by focusing on four different phenomena: 
the proliferation of actors, norms, and organizations in international law; 
and the expansion of jurisdiction in international law. This Article then 
assesses the role that globalized international law plays in different legal 
fields, namely, international human rights, international criminal law, 
and private international law. Finally, this Article focuses on the impact of 
globalized international law on state actors, as well as on the individual, 
by reshaping their behavior in the international realm. 
I. Transformation of International Law 
 International law, as studied through a traditional framework, in-
cluded two types of normative systems: one promulgated by states 
themselves for their domestic relations, and the other promulgated 
among states for inter-state relations.6 Throughout the twentieth cen-
                                                                                                                      
their emphasis from bounded “societies” to a “starting point that concentrates upon ana-
lyzing how social life is ordered across time and space.” Anthony Giddens, The Conse-
quences of Modernity 64 (1990). 
2 See infra Part II. 
3 See id. 
4 See John Alan Cohan, Sovereignty in a Postsovereign World, 18 Fla. J. Int’l L. 907, 910 
(2006). 
5 See id. at 936, 941. 
6 See Berman, supra note 1, at 487. 
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tury, such a formal view of international law became inadequate. For 
one, the creation of individually enforceable norms in the field of in-
ternational human rights transformed individuals into international 
law players.7 Moreover, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) came 
to play a prominent role on the international legal scene, as did various 
regional organizations, institutions, and judicial bodies.8 The prolifera-
tion of actors in international law contributed to a proliferation of in-
ternational legal norms.9 Moreover, even classic legal actors, such as 
courts, changed their role in light of this modernization of interna-
tional law.10 For example, judges today seem more willing to “apply in-
ternational norms transnationally, to engage in a transnational judicial 
dialogue, and even to adopt conceptions of universal jurisdiction.”11 
 Thus, as scholars have already noted, international law has trans-
formed itself, changed by the powerful forces of globalization.12 Global-
ization refers to a “stretching process” in which “connections have been 
made between different social contexts or regions and become net-
worked across the earth as a whole.”13 For the purposes of international 
law, globalization means that, in a globalized world, international law 
recognizes different state interests and finds ways to give effect to them, 
with the specific consequence that what one state does on a particular 
matter may be of specific interest to another state.14 Thus, activities that 
were treated as local under the traditional conception of international 
law are now internationalized.15 
 Moreover, to add to this globalization puzzle, international legal 
norms seem no longer to be created mainly by state actors.16 Rather, 
today we deal with a world of “transnational law-making [and] cross-
border interaction,” where state and non-state actors together “dissemi-
                                                                                                                      
7 See id. at 488. 
8 See id. at 488–89. 
9 See id. at 489. 
10 See id. 
11 Berman, supra note 1, at 489. For a discussion of universal jurisdiction, see infra Part 
II.D. 
12 See generally Berman, supra note 1 (describing transformation of international law 
into law on globalization); Sands, supra note 1 (explaining impact of globalization on field 
of international law). 
13 Sands, supra note 1, at 537; see Giddens, supra note 1, at 64. On globalization in 
general and its effect on the law, see generally Richard Falk, Predatory Globalization: 
A Critique (1999); Peter J. Spiro, Globalization, International Law, and the Academy, 32 
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 567 (2000); Brigitte Stern, How to Regulate Globalization?, in The 
Role of Law in International Politics 247 (Michael Byers ed., 2000). 
14 See Sands, supra note 1, at 537. 
15 Id. at 538. 
16 Berman, supra note 1, at 492. 
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nate alternative normative systems across a diffuse and constantly shift-
ing global landscape.”17 Four phenomena caused by the globalization of 
international law include the proliferation of actors, norms, and organi-
zations in international law, as well as the expansion of traditional inter-
national jurisdictional concepts. 
A. New Actors in International Law 
 Traditionally, international law involved state actors and inter-state 
relations. 18  Individuals, organizations, regional bodies, non-govern-
mental institutions, and the like were left outside the reach of interna-
tional law.19 The United Nations (U.N.) was a forum open exclusively 
to state parties. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), as well as its 
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), were 
reserved for state grievances.20 It was inconceivable that an individual 
would come before such tribunals, or that international law would gov-
ern anything but relations among state parties.21 
 Today, the converse is true.22 International law, in its transformed 
or globalized version, governs all sorts of relations, including those im-
plicating states, regional bodies, NGOs, trade organizations, commer-
cial actors, and private individuals.23 It spreads into legal fields such as 
environmental law, labor law, trade regulations, antitrust, health, and 
insurance law.24 Non-state actors play increasingly important roles in 
                                                                                                                      
17 Id. 
18 Id. (observing that traditional international law scholars “located international law 
in the acts of official governmental bureaucratic entities, such as the treaties and agree-
ments entered into by nation-states, the declarations and protocols of the United Nations 
. . . or other affiliated bodies, and the rulings of international courts and tribunals”) (cit-
ing Barry E. Carter & Philip R. Trimble, International Law 2 (3d ed. 1999)). 
19 See Barry E. Carter et al., International Law 14 (5th ed. 2007) (noting that 
traditional concept of international law “was generally one of law between nation states”). 
20 See id. at 298 (stating that main function of ICJ “is to decide legal disputes between 
states”) (emphasis added). 
21 See Berman, supra note 1, at 487 (noting that “[i]n an earlier generation,” the study 
of international law focused only on norms “promulgated by nation-states and . . . among 
nation-states”). 
22 See Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 
301, 312 (2007). 
23 See id. (concluding that we need “a more fine-grained, nuanced understanding of 
the way legal norms are passed on” from such different groups, to begin to study law and 
globalization). 
24 See id. 
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such fields, including regional organizations, specialized bodies such as 
trade organizations, NGOs, and private individuals.25 
 Regional organizations play dominant roles within their “jurisdic-
tions.” The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is such a 
prominent regional power that it acts as a sovereign in matters of trade 
within the continent.26 In Europe, the European Union (EU) under-
takes a sovereign role in matters such as labor law, consumer regula-
tions, antitrust, and environmental law.27 Moreover, NGOs play a hugely 
important role on the international scene. They challenge traditional 
models of state sovereignty with regard to different areas of law, and in 
particular human rights norms; they formulate global standards of cor-
porate behavior; and they generally claim to represent some sort of a 
global interest. 28  Another example, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), dictates the terms of global trade by creating norms, establish-
ing an entirely new jurisdiction to handle disputes, and tying state and 
non-state interest in a global web of trade relationships embodied in the 
organization’s structure and processes.29 Finally, private individuals ex-
ercise increasing influence in the international legal field.30 Private par-
                                                                                                                      
25 See id. (noting the “wide variety of non-state actors engaged in the establishment of 
norms that operate internationally and transnationally”); see also id. at 321 (observing that 
states themselves are “increasingly delegating power to private actors who exist in a shad-
owy world of quasi-public/quasi-private authority”). 
26 See Berman, supra note 1, at 535 (discussing authority of NAFTA’s ad hoc tribunals 
over national courts as an example of NAFTA’s power to articulate jurisdictional norms). 
27 See Cohan, supra note 4, at 940 (considering EU role in modern world and noting 
both its active participation in many substantive conferences and membership in several 
international organizations). 
28 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 1, at 546 (stating that NGOs are “an important norma-
tive force on the international scene”); id. at 547 (noting that “[NGOs] formulate global 
standards of corporate behavior” in the fields of human rights, environmental protection, 
and fair labor standards); id. at 548 (“NGOs often claim to represent a global polity.”); see 
also Chandler H. Udo, Note, Nongovernmental Organizations and African Governments: Seeking 
an Effective International Legal Framework in a New Era of Health and Development Aid, 31 B.C. 
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev 371 (2008) (evaluating status of NGOs in international law). Some, 
however, view NGOs more as interest groups focused on particular issues than as represen-
tatives of general constituencies. See Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning 
Landmines: The Role of International Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of Interna-
tional Civil Society, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 91, 119 (2000). 
29 Many commentators have noted the increasing role of the WTO in developing a 
global common law of international trade. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 1, at 521; Raj 
Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 Am. 
U. Int’l L. Rev. 845, 850 (1999). 
30 See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Privatization of Public International Law, 25 Geo. Wash. J. 
Int’l L. & Econ. 523, 544 (1991) (“[T]he concerns, the actors, and the processes of ‘pub-
lic’ international law have been expanded— ‘privatized’ —in this century.”); see also Ber-
man, supra note 1, at 520 (“[C]onflicts law and international business transactions have 
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ties can now enter into investment treaties with state parties; moreover, 
they can sue state parties in specific tribunals for breaches of such in-
vestment relations.31 Private parties can also rely on international law to 
obtain certain guarantees, particularly in the field of human rights, and 
they can sue state parties for violations of such international standards.32 
 Thus, it is no longer true that international law represents a body 
of law that solely governs relations among states; on the contrary, it is 
a complex web of treaties, regulations, customary norms, and codes of 
conduct that shapes relationships among state as well as non-state ac-
tors along horizontal and vertical axes of power.33 
B. Proliferation of Norms in International Law 
 International law today encompasses many different norms. 34 
These include: multiple conventions and treaties in several of areas of 
law; a significant number of customary norms ranging from fields such 
as human rights to foreign direct investment, a vast number of interna-
tional legal decisions stemming from various international tribunals; 
numerous international legal doctrines emanating from scholars and 
publicists writing in a broad range of fields; and soft law instruments 
                                                                                                                      
become a staple of state-to-state relations, and non-state or private actors have taken an 
increasingly important role in the articulation and enforcement of international stan-
dards.”). 
31 See Aron Broches, Selected Essays: World Bank, ICSID, and Other Subjects 
of Public and Private International Law 198 (1995) (noting that under Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
(ICSID Convention), private creditors may sue debtor states in an international forum); see 
also Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Collected Essays on International Investments 
and on International Organizations 374 (1998) (describing different dispute resolu-
tion systems that protect investors’ rights); G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model 
and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 25 Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 
703, 715 (2004) (examining WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism). 
32 See, e.g., Claudio Grossman, The Velasquez Rodriguez Case: The Development of the Inter-
American Human Rights System, in International Law Stories 77, 82 ( John E. Noyes et al. 
eds., 2007) (stating that individuals can bring complaints against state parties in Inter-
American Court of Human Rights); Sands, supra note 1, at 546–47 (describing how indi-
viduals can bring claims against state parties in European Court of Human Rights); see also 
Berman, supra note 1, at 521 (noting a “proliferation of international tribunals” in human 
rights area); infra Part III.A. 
33 See Berman, supra note 22, at 311–12 (challenging the “top-down” conception of in-
ternational law and calling for the need “to approach the multifaceted ways in which legal 
norms develop”). 
34 See Sands, supra note 1, at 548 (noting a great increase in norms of international 
law). 
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such as codes of conduct, gentlemen’s agreements, and governmental 
statements.35 
 Such a proliferation of international legal norms stems from sev-
eral factors. First, the latter half of the twentieth century has witnessed 
an increase in the number of international legal bodies—organizations, 
institutions, conferences, and tribunals—which all, as one of their roles, 
draft and issue international law instruments.36 Second, also over the 
course of the last century, international law has expanded into a variety 
of fields that were traditionally left to state sovereign reign.37 There are 
now more international laws and regulations in health law, consumer 
law, labor law, and antitrust law.38 Third, and most important, interna-
tional law now plays a different role in today’s globalized world. While a 
century ago, international law was only meant to govern relations 
among states, this is no longer true.39 International law aims to influ-
ence a variety of state and non-state actors in many different legal fields 
and along different normative axes.40 It influences national legislative 
bodies, 41  supreme judicial organs, 42  individual expectations, 43  diplo-
                                                                                                                      
35 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff et al., International Law: Norms, Action, Process 
28 (2d ed. 2006). 
36 See Sands, supra note 1, at 553 (noting that today there are over twenty-five perma-
nent international courts and tribunals); see also Carter et al., supra note 19, at 11–13 
(describing different international norm-creating institutions that have developed since 
World War II); Harold Hongju Koh, Is There a “New” New Haven School of International Law, 
32 Yale J. Int’l L. 559, 564 (2007) (remarking that today we live in a world where “non-
state actors are capable of serving as transnational decisionmakers”). 
37 Sands, supra note 1, at 548 (“International laws now address a broad and growing 
range of economic, political, and social matters.”); id. at 548–49 (explaining that same 
proliferation of international law erodes state sovereignty). 
38 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 29 (noting that both breadth and depth of interna-
tional law have increased “as the law regulates more areas than ever before”). 
39 See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 287 (3d ed. 1979); 
Sands, supra note 1, at 527 (stating that international law traditionally was seen as a “set of 
rules with the object of preserving the peace and harmony of nations”). 
40 See id. (noting that international law today “serves a broader range of societal inter-
ests, and that it now connects with a wider range of actors and subjects”). 
41 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814–15 (1993) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (stating, in his infamous dissent, that one of the outstanding canons of statutory 
interpretation is the presumption that Congress, when it passes a law, acts in accordance 
with the law of nations). 
42 See generally Torres v. State, No. PCD-04–442, 2004 WL 3711623, (Okla. Crim. App. 
May 13, 2004). In Torres, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals commuted the death 
sentence of a foreign national in light of an ICJ ruling directing the United States not to 
execute foreign nationals whose rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions had not been respected. See id. at *6. 
43 See infra Part III.B. 
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matic concerns, foreign policy issues, and a vast number of domestic 
legal areas on a substantive level. 
 It may be true that the proliferation of legal norms itself contrib-
uted to the perception that international law is inherently present 
across such different legal spheres. It may conversely be said that it is 
actually the higher level of interaction among state and non-state par-
ties in recent decades has caused this very same proliferation of inter-
national legal rules. In other words, the more states and non-state ac-
tors interact, the more friction they create and the more law they need 
to resolve their differences. Similarly, global interaction also induces 
parties to negotiate to prevent friction and future disputes, thereby 
contributing to the proliferation of international legal norms. 
C. Proliferation of Organizations in International Law 
 International law has not only witnessed a proliferation of legal 
norms, but also an expansion in the number of international legal or-
ganizations.44 At the end of World War I, the victorious states created 
the League of Nations, a body charged with preventing of another 
bloody war and the U.N.’s predecessor organization. 45  At the same 
time, states realized that an international arbitrator may be needed in 
other substantive areas, such as health, labor, or communications law.46 
In other words, states seemed to realize that if they achieved coordina-
tion in substantive areas of law, they would then be less likely to engage 
in violent conflict in general.47 Thus, the League of Nations was outfit-
ted with special offices, such as the International Telecommunication 
Union and the International Labour Office, charged with the task of 
studying and promoting international cooperation on various issues of 
international interest. 48 Along the same lines, the PCIJ was created, 
leading at least some to believe that the peaceful settlement of disputes 
through international law was possible.49 Although these developments 
                                                                                                                      
44 See Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 27 (“[T]he institutionalization of international 
law that began in significant part with the League of Nations accelerated in the post-war 
era.”). 
45 Id. at 16 (noting that League of Nations was created to address questions of war and 
peace). 
46 Id. 
47 See id. 
48 Id. (“The result was a shift in the way much international law was made, as the 
League took the lead in preparing multilateral treaties on many subjects, encouraged 
states to reach bilateral agreements, and drafted many nontreaty instruments that came to 
be influential among states.”). 
49 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 16. 
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proved inefficient in preventing World War II, they at least geared 
states toward joint organizational efforts as a method of preventing 
conflict.50 
 The end of World War II saw the creation of the U.N.—the su-
preme international organization. The U.N. was charged with many 
tasks but most importantly, was conceived as a global peacekeeper that 
would replace any unilateral use of force with joint decision-making 
and acting on the international legal scene.51 In the wake of the estab-
lishment of the U.N., other regional bodies, assuming the roles of re-
gional peacekeepers, were born. In Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) was established. With mostly Western European 
nations and the United States as its members, NATO countered the 
threatening power of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
during the Cold War.52 In Africa, the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) was created as a mixed organization: its mis-
sion was economic, but it encompassed mercenary forces charged with 
keeping peace in West Africa.53 
 Embracing the post-World War I notions of preventing conflict by 
transferring substantive decision-making in different areas to interna-
tional bodies, international actors engaged in negotiation to create in-
ternational monetary, trade, economic, insurance, investment, and 
other types of organizations.54 Thus, a multitude of international or-
ganizations were created in the latter half of the twentieth century, in-
cluding the International Monetary Fund, the WTO, the World Bank, 
the International Center for the Settlement of Insurance Disputes (IC-
SID), and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 55 
Similarly, states within the same regions acted to create regional or-
ganizations charged with similar objectives.56 The Organization for Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe, the Association of Southeast Asian 
                                                                                                                      
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 25 (noting U.N. formed in 1945 as a multilateral body designed to address a 
diverse set of issues while its Security Council maintains international peace and security). 
52 Id. at 26. 
53 Carter et al., supra note 19, at 1070 (noting that ECOWAS “began peacekeeping 
operations in Liberia” and that “its forces have since operated in Sierra Leone and the 
Ivory Coast”); Davis Brown, The Role of Regional Organizations in Stopping Civil Wars, 41 A.F. 
L. Rev. 235, 256 (1997) (describing dual economic and peacekeeping roles of ECOWAS). 
54 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 16 (describing a “shift” in how international law was 
made post-World War I because League of Nation “took the lead in preparing multilateral 
treaties . . . , engaging states to negotiate bilateral treaties, and in drafting many non-
treaty instruments”). 
55 Id. at 26. 
56 Id. 
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Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Organization of 
African Unity are examples of such regional bodies.57 
 The higher level of interaction among international law actors in 
the twentieth century seems to have produced a myriad of interna-
tional and regional bodies charged with resolving state, and non-state 
actors’ differences on substantive levels as well as providing an institu-
tional forum where such actors can assert their grievances.58 
D. Expansion of Jurisdiction in International Law 
 It seems logical that the recent higher level of international in-
teraction would produce more friction. To resolve disputes and allo-
cate international responsibility, international law has developed and 
expanded its traditional notion of jurisdiction.59 Historically, jurisdic-
tion was conceived as the sovereign’s power within a defined territory 
to impose and enforce its laws on its subjects and in its judicial or-
gans.60 Today, however, jurisdiction in international law is mostly ex-
tra-territorial.61 
 First, the development of human rights norms has contributed to 
the idea that some crimes are so heinous that any nation in the world, 
acting on behalf of the entire international community, can punish an 
offender.62 The concept of universal jurisdiction was thus born, defined 
as the power of any state to punish offenders of universal crimes, such 
as piracy, war crimes, slave trade, or genocide, without requiring any 
                                                                                                                      
57 Id. 
58 See supra Part I.C. 
59 Berman, supra note 1, at 530–31 (discussing how traditional concepts of jurisdiction 
“have had difficulty adapting” with challenges caused by globalization). 
60 Id. at 530 (noting that traditionally, questions of jurisdiction were analyzed by refer-
ence to physical location). 
61 Id. at 531 (noting existence of extra-territorial regulation in field of trademark rules, 
tort law, criminal investigations, internet transactions, and human rights violations). 
62 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 404 (1987). The develop-
ment of the human rights movement implied, first, that what a state did to its own citizens 
was of international concern and that government officials could be held responsible and 
prosecuted for abuses against their own population. See Carter et al., supra note 19, at 779 
(noting that Nuremberg trials after World War II were “important precedents in establishing 
the responsibility of government officials for human rights abuses, even abuses committed 
against their own population”). The development of human rights norms then came to en-
compass the idea that some crimes are so horrific that any state can punish offenders in the 
name of the world community. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 404 
(“A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized 
by the community of nations as of universal concern.”) (emphasis added). 
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territorial or substantive links to the prosecuting forum. 63  Adolf 
Eichmann, for example, a German citizen living in Argentina, was tried 
in Israel, under the theory of universal jurisdiction, for crimes against 
humanity that he committed during World War II in Germany, before 
Israel even became a state.64 General Augusto Pinochet was indicted in 
Spain on charges of crimes against humanity for acts committed against 
Spanish victims during his dictatorship of Chile.65 Hissein Habré, who 
ruled Chad in the 1980s, was recently subject to an international arrest 
warrant in Belgium, under Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law.66 
 Moreover, states have been willing to grant access to their domestic 
courts to victims of human rights violations, even where such victims 
are foreign, or when such violations occurred in foreign countries, or 
were committed by foreign defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Alien Tort Statute67 to provide jurisdiction—and possi-
bly a cause of action—to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign defendants for 
violations of the laws of nations.68 Similarly, U.S. federal courts have 
entertained judicial challenges to the system of military commissions 
President Bush established to try al Qaeda detainees.69 This exemplifies 
                                                                                                                      
63 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 380 (“The traditional rationale for universal juris-
diction is that the prohibited acts are of an international character and are of serious con-
cern to the international community as a whole.”). 
64 See generally Attorney-General of the State of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 
(1962). 
65 Berman, supra note 1, at 534–35; David Sugerman, From Unimaginable to Possible: 
Spain, Pinochet, and the Judicialization of Power, 3 J. Spanish Cultural Studs. 107, 116 
(2002). 
66 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 383. 
67 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
68 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712–18 (2004). The Court held that the Alien 
Tort Statute is a jurisdictional statute and that it was not intended to create a new cause of 
action for torts in violation of international law. Id. at 712–15. The first Congress, instead, 
understood that the Alien Tort Statute would provide a cause of action for a limited num-
ber of violations of the law of nations, such as violation of safe conducts, infringement of 
the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. Id. at 724. Today, “[C]ourts should require any claim 
based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character ac-
cepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of 
the [eighteenth] century paradigms we have recognized.” Id. at 725; see also Filartiga v. 
Pena Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that Alien Tort Statute provides ju-
risdiction to a foreign plaintiff for a violation of law of nations). 
69 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a five-justice majority of the Court held that the military 
commission system set up by the Bush Administration to try al Qaeda detainees did not 
satisfy the requirements of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See 126 S. 
Ct. 2749 (2006). Although the Court did not decide whether these Conventions gave rise 
to judicially enforceable private rights in domestic courts, the majority struck down the 
military commissions because the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the statutory authority 
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once more the expanded role of domestic courts in litigation centering 
on human rights abuses and implying violations of international legal 
obligations. 
 Finally, because state and non-state actors interact frequently on 
the international commercial scene, states have been willing to assert 
extra-territorial jurisdiction to regulate commercial conduct occurring 
abroad but having an effect on domestic markets.70 For example, the 
United States relies on the so-called “effects doctrine” to establish the 
extra-territorial reach of the Sherman Act, which U.S. courts have held 
to regulate conduct occurring abroad.71 Similarly, U.S. courts rely on a 
variation of the “effects doctrine” to regulate securities markets and to 
reach fraudulent conduct that took place abroad.72 European market 
authorities, although initially critical of the U.S. approach, seem to 
have adopted similar jurisdictional tests that strive for the imposition of 
extra-territorial regulation of foreign conduct having effects on the 
European market.73 
 Related issues have arisen in connection with the regulation of 
Internet activities.74 Recently, a French court ordered Yahoo! to block 
                                                                                                                      
for the President to establish military commissions, is conditioned on compliance with the 
law of war, including the Geneva Conventions. Id. at 2786, 2794. 
70 Berman, supra note 1, at 531 (noting problems caused by cross-border activity and 
desire by local communities to apply their norms to extra-territorial activities). Such extra-
territorial regulation has already occurred in fields such as antitrust, securities, tax, and 
trademark protection. See Milena Sterio, Clash of the Titans: Collisions of Economic Regulations 
and the Need to Harmonize Prescriptive Jurisdiction Rules, 13 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 95, 
100–04 (2007). 
71 See generally LaRoche v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (recognizing extra-territorial 
reach of Sherman Act, but holding that exercise of such jurisdiction would not be reason-
able where a foreign plaintiff’s claim is based wholly on foreign harm because it “creates a 
serious risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate its own 
commercial affairs”); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); United 
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). But see Timberlane Lumber 
Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (tempering extra-territorial 
application of Sherman Act with considerations of “international comity”). 
72 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968); Dunoff et al., supra 
note 35, at 373; see also Consol. Gold Fields v. Minorco, 871 F.2d 252, 261–62 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
73 See Case 89/95, Ahlstrom v. Comm’n. (Wood Pulp Cartel), 1988 E.C.R. 5193 (up-
holding extra-territorial assertion of European Community competition law where con-
duct occurred abroad but was “implemented” within European market). Note that the 
European Court of Justice never adopted the infamous “effects” test, but that in practice, 
its “implementation” test operates very similarly to the effects test. See Dunoff et al., supra 
note 35, at 375. 
74 Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 
Nov. 20, 2000, Ordonnance de référé (Fr.), available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/ ju-
risfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.htm. For a discussion of the case, see Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo 
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access in France to a Yahoo! auction site selling Nazi memorabilia, as 
the sale of such items was illegal under French law.75 Yahoo! immedi-
ately moved for a U.S. court order declaring the French court order 
unenforceable, provoking a judicial battle.76 Ultimately, Yahoo! capitu-
lated by deciding to comply with the French order,77 but this judicial 
controversy highlights particularly well a type of extraterritorial prob-
lem linked to the assertion of jurisdiction in today’s globalized world.78 
 Thus, jurisdiction in modern globalized international law recog-
nizes interaction among all sorts of international state and non-state 
actors and provides not only access to more tribunals, but also a basis 
for imposing substantive laws in an extra-territorial manner.79 
II. The Role of International Law in Different Fields 
 The globalization and evolution of international law has impacted 
different legal fields. Three areas where the effects of globalization are 
most striking include human rights law, international criminal law, and 
private international law. 
                                                                                                                      
and Democracy on the Internet, 42 Jurimetrics J. 261 (2002). For a discussion of internet 
jurisdiction, see generally Kevin A. Meehan, Note, The Continuing Conundrum of Interna-
tional Internet Jurisdiction, 31 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 345 (2008). 
75 See Ordonnance de référé, supra note 74. 
76 Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 
1181, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2001). The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision on the ground that 
the district court could not obtain personal jurisdiction over the original French plaintiffs 
until they actually sought to enforce the judgment or otherwise engaged in activity in Cali-
fornia. Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemistisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 1126–27 
(9th Cir. 2004). 
77 See Press Release, Yahoo!, Yahoo! Enhances Commerce Sites for Higher Quality 
Online Experience ( Jan. 2, 2001), available at http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/release 
675.html (announcing new product guidelines for its auction sites that prohibit “items that 
are associated with groups which promote or glorify hatred and violence”). 
78 See Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 349. For an example of similar extra-territorial at-
tempts to regulate commercial activity provoking cross-Atlantic tension, consider the August 
2001 EU Statement of Objections accusing Microsoft of illegally tying its Windows Media 
Player software into its Windows 2000 desktop software. See Case No. T-201/04, Microsoft 
Corp. v. Comm’n of Eur. Cmty., 2004 E.C.R., available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/com- 
petition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf. 
79 See Berman, supra note 1, at 537 (“This more fluid model of multiple affiliations, 
multiple jurisdictional assertions, and multiple normative statements captures more accu-
rately than the classical model of territoriality and sovereignty the way legal rules are being 
formed and applied in today’s world.”). 
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A. International Human Rights 
 International law in its proliferated, or globalized version has 
played an important role in human rights law, where the evolutionary 
trend on the international scene has had a major impact. 
1. Creation of International Norms 
 The evolution of international law has created many new human 
rights norms. 80  Throughout the twentieth century, several human 
rights conventions have been negotiated, and many customary human 
rights norms have emerged.81 These new human rights norms are sig-
nificant not only because of their expanded number, but also because 
of their evolutionary nature. Because international law is no longer lim-
ited to governing purely state relations, but also encompasses the rela-
tionship of non-state actors vis-à-vis states, a different set of norms has 
emerged to cover these new relations.82 
 For example, the prohibition on torture arising out of the 1984 
Torture Convention83 and other treaties and international customary 
norms,84 necessarily implies several things. Parties to the Torture Con-
                                                                                                                      
80 See Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 17 (“[T]he human tragedy of World War II led 
governments . . . to devote significant resources to the creation of a corpus of law aimed 
at protecting individuals from their own governments.”). 
81 See id. (“States prepared and signed onto treaties covering genocide, civil and politi-
cal rights, economic rights, racial discrimination, women’s rights, apartheid, torture, and 
children’s rights.”). For examples of the major documents in the human rights field nego-
tiated after World War II, see generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 44; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture 
Convention]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243; Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 
277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
82 See supra Part I.B. 
83 See generally Torture Convention, supra note 81, art. 2 (“Each State Party shall take 
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in 
any territory under its jurisdiction. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a 
state of war or a threat or war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, 
may be invoked as a justification of torture.”). 
84 See, e.g., Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention to Prevent 
and Punish Torture art. 4, Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S. T.S., No. 67; Organization of American 
States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 27(2), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S., No. 
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vention may not institute torture as an official governmental policy in 
their international relations with other states.85 Moreover, states may not 
treat individuals in ways that amount to torture, even when such indi-
viduals are their own citizens.86 Officials of one state may even attempt 
to prosecute officials of another state for acts that constitute torture.87 
 As the Torture Convention illustrates, these new types of interna-
tional human rights norms differ from other, more traditional types of 
international norms.88 Under traditional international law norms, State 
A may not do certain things to State B, State C, or any other State. Con-
versely, States B, C, or any other state may not do the same thing to 
State A. States A, B, and C, however, may do whatever they wish within 
their own borders. New human rights norms vary strikingly from this 
traditional model. For one, they are not limited to the regulation of the 
behavior of State A vis-à-vis other states; rather, they are able to regulate 
what State A does to its own citizens and residents within its borders, as 
well as requiring State A to justify its behavior before States B and C, at 
                                                                                                                      
36; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms art. 15(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221. 
85 See Torture Convention, supra note 81, art. 1. The Torture Convention specifically 
defines “torture” in its main article as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . when such pain or suffering 
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.” Id. (emphasis added). The Torture Convention specifi-
cally prohibits state-sponsored torture. See id. For a discussion of the workings of the Tor-
ture Convention, see Edwin Odhiambo-Abuya, Reinforcing Refugee Protection in the Wake of the 
War on Terror, 30 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 227, 281–94 (2007). 
86 See Torture Convention, supra note 81, art. 2. The Torture Convention strengthens ex-
isting norms against torture in many ways: it requires state parties to present reports focused 
explicitly on torture; it creates an expert committee to review those reports; and it provides 
for an optional individual complaints procedure. Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 450. Israel, 
for example, has been criticized by the Committee Against Torture, a special committee of 
experts established by the Torture Convention, because of its controversial interrogation 
techniques. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the 
Convention: Israel, U.N. Doc. A/49/44 (1994). This criticism exemplifies the notion that 
under modern international law, states may no longer do whatever they wish within their 
jurisdiction. See id. Similarly, the United States has faced significant international criticism in 
light of its own more aggressive interrogation techniques in the “Global War on Terror.” See 
Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 465–66. 
87 The concept of universal jurisdiction allows a forum to prosecute an individual 
when that individual’s alleged crimes have absolutely no territorial nexus with the prose-
cuting state. See Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 380. The leader of State A, who tortured 
people within State A, could theoretically be subject to criminal prosecution in State B, if 
State B has an expansive universal jurisdiction statute, even though State B has no other 
connection to the acts of torture that took place within State A. See id. 
88 See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text. 
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the risk of seeing its leaders indicted for violations of such human 
rights norms in States B and C.89 
 These new types of human rights norms are coupled with other 
changes in international law in a manner that strengthens their role in 
state behavior.90 As mentioned above, states traditionally exercised their 
jurisdictional powers territorially.91 The evolutionary trend of interna-
tional law has led states to rely more and more on extra-territorial ju-
risdiction.92 Such a powerful application of state judicial powers has 
been particularly important in the human rights field. New human 
rights norms are often accompanied by the notion of universal jurisdic-
tion, meaning they can be enforced by any state, anywhere in the world, 
against any offenders. The Torture Convention has a provision provid-
ing for universal jurisdiction for possible prosecutions of offenders.93 
New human rights norms sometimes go beyond simply prohibiting 
states from doing something; some impose certain duties on states, 
such as the duty to either prosecute or extradite offenders.94 
 Finally, modern human rights norms are more potent in light of 
the globalization of international law. In other words, because of the 
proliferation of actors in modern international law, states, as well as 
various non-state actors, are now charged with the creation, imple-
mentation, and monitoring of human rights norms. Thus, 
[I]ndividual states, the United Nations, and various regional 
organizations, including the Council of Europe, the Organiza-
tion of American States, and the Organization of African Unity, 
working with countless non-governmental human rights or-
ganizations, scholars, and lawyers, have developed an extensive 
body of human rights treaties, declarations, and related in-
                                                                                                                      
89 States today are, therefore, obligated to cede sovereignty to the international com-
munity, which “imposes standards of good governance and human rights norms” on all 
states. Cohan, supra note 4, at 941. 
90 See supra Part I (discussing overall transformation of international law). 
91 See Berman, supra note 1, at 530. 
92 For a discussion of extra-territorial jurisdiction, see supra Part II.D. 
93 Torture Convention, supra note 81, art. 5. Article 5 of the Torture Convention pro-
vides for different bases of jurisdiction, including territorial jurisdiction, passive personal-
ity, and nationality principles. Id. art. 5(1)–(3). Article 5 goes on to specify that “[e]ach 
State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction 
over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its 
jurisdiction.” Id. art. 5(2). 
94 See id. art. 7 (containing an “extradite or prosecute” provision); Genocide Conven-
tion, supra note 81, art. 5 (containing a provision requiring member states to “give effect to 
the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties 
for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III”). 
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struments in an effort to develop and clarify international 
human rights norms. These same actors have also developed a 
complex system of institutions designed to monitor and to 
some extent to implement existing norms. These institutions 
include regional human rights courts, treaty bodies, groups of 
experts, and more.95 
State and non-state actors thus work together to promote, implement, 
and monitor the myriad of human rights norms, creating a powerful 
regime of human rights protection and regulations. 
2. Limitations on State Sovereignty 
 Because of their powerful reach and impact on state behavior, new 
human rights norms impose severe limitations on state sovereignty.96 
They dictate that State A may no longer act however it wishes within its 
own borders—contrary to centuries of customary international law. 
Precisely because the globalized version of international law takes into 
account individual interests, it affords individuals more protection from 
state intrusion into their affairs by limiting state sovereign powers. 
 It had long been the role of domestic law to define what a sover-
eign may do to its subjects.97 For example, nobody would dispute that 
the U.S. Constitution grants the President numerous powers: to enter 
into agreements with other nations; to nominate judges to the Supreme 
Court; and to approve the congressional budget.98 Nor would anyone 
dispute that Congress has the power to draft laws that criminalize cer-
tain individual behaviors, or require citizens to pay taxes, or mandate 
                                                                                                                      
95 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 443. 
96 In fact, many scholars have noted that the traditional nineteenth century model of 
state sovereignty became outdated in the twentieth century. See, e.g., Kenichi Ohmae, The 
End of the Nation State, at viii (1995); Matthew Horsman & Andrew Marshall, 
After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism and the New World Disorder, at ix 
(1994) (“The traditional nation-state, the fruit of centuries of political, social and eco-
nomic evolution, is under threat.”); George J. Demko & William B. Wood, Introduction: 
International Relations Through the Prism of Geography, in Reordering The World: Geopo-
litical Perspectives on the Twenty-First Century 3, 10 (George J. Demko & William 
B. Wood eds., 1994) (“Once sacrosanct, the concept of a state’s sovereignty—the immuta-
bility of its international boundaries—is now under serious threat.”); see also Berman, supra 
note 1, at 523. 
97 See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (“[E]very State possesses exclusive 
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.”) (citing Joseph 
Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, ch. 2 (1869)). 
98 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2 (giving President power to “make treaties”); id. art. I, § 7 (de-
scribing checks and balances procedure under which President may veto a bill originating in 
Congress, thereby giving President power to override proposed congressional budget). 
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licenses to engage in certain professional activities.99 We accept the no-
tion that our sovereign, domestically, can require us to do certain 
things or to refrain from doing certain things. We also respect the idea 
that if another individual, or our sovereign, does something that of-
fends our rights, we can seek redress through judicial institutions. 
 The evolutionary version of international law attempts to play a 
similar role by creating important human rights norms that function 
somewhat like domestic law. New human rights norms require sover-
eigns, as well as individuals, to refrain from engaging in certain types of 
behavior, and as a corollary, to perform certain actions.100 For example, 
a sovereign may not condone torture as an official state practice; if it 
finds out that someone in its territory has engaged in torture, it must 
punish such groups or individuals accordingly.101 Because new human 
rights norms sometimes create judicially enforceable private rights,102 
individuals can seek redress from domestic or international judicial 
bodies for violations thereof, either by other individuals or by their own 
sovereign.103 The latter idea—that one may sue their own sovereign for 
violations of supra-national norms that transcend and limit the sover-
                                                                                                                      
99 Id. art. I (giving Congress general power to legislate). 
100 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 17 (“[T]he growth of the human rights movement 
fundamentally challenged the notion that states were free to do what they wanted within 
their own border.”). 
101 Torture Convention, supra note 81, arts. 1 & 7. Other international conventions, 
moreover, impose affirmative duties on states to punish violators of norms that such con-
ventions seek to protect. See, e.g., Convention (No. 4) Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention No. 4]; Convention (No. 3) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War art. 130, Aug. 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 
No. 3]; Convention (No. 2) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. 2]; Convention (No. 1) for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 50, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31l [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. 1]; Genocide 
Convention, supra note 81, art. 4. 
102 In the United States, for example, there has been significant debate over whether 
certain provisions of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations grant individuals pri-
vate judicially enforceable rights in U.S. courts. See Bruno Simma & Carsten Hoppe, The 
LaGrand Case: A Story of Many Miscommunications, in International Law Stories, supra 
note 32, at 371, 371–405. The debate centers on whether an international treaty creates 
individual rights that may be enforced in a domestic court of law against a domestic sover-
eign. Id. 
103 See Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 443. As noted above, individuals today are pro-
vided with numerous complaint procedures through international and regional organiza-
tions, committees, tribunals, and other judicial bodies. See id. 
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eign’s powers—is particularly revolutionary and had no place in tradi-
tional international law.104 
 The field of human rights law, in itself, represents a stark depar-
ture from traditional international law models. In its modern, evolu-
tionary version, human rights law places limits on state sovereignty and 
establishes norms that govern inter-state and intra-state behavior. 105 
Thus, the “new” state sovereignty actually requires states to participate 
in a complex web of transnational regimes, institutions, and networks 
to accomplish what they could once do on their own, within their spe-
cific jurisdiction.106 
 Globalized international law has imposed so-called “vertical con-
straints” on states, whereby external human rights norms are imposed 
on states “by diplomatic and public persuasion, coercion, shaming, 
economic sanctions, isolation, and in more egregious cases, by hu-
manitarian intervention.” 107 A direct result of this phenomenon is 
that a sovereign state must now answer not only to its own nationals, 
but also to the international community as a whole.108 A state may no 
longer reject a norm based on a claim of exclusive sovereignty, as such 
a notion no longer exists.109 Sovereignty will no longer operate as an 
excuse for violations of human rights norms against slavery, genocide, 
torture, or arbitrary confiscation of property. Moreover, human rights 
norms have evolved to encompass claims of indigenous populations, 
special needs of the disabled, health care, and education.110 
The most fundamental point about human rights law is that it 
establishes a set of rules for all states and all peoples. It thus 
seeks to increase world unity and to counteract national sepa-
rateness. . . . In this sense, the international law of human 
rights is revolutionary because it contradicts the notion of national 
                                                                                                                      
104 EU citizens may sue their own states in the European Court of Human Rights for 
particular human rights violations. Sands, supra note 1, at 546–47. Similarly, citizens of 
Central and South American countries may bring complaints against their states in the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Grossman, supra note 32, 81–83; see infra Part II.A 
(discussing individual expectations under globalized international law). 
105 Berman, supra note 1, at 527 (“While nation-states may not disappear, their sover-
eignty may well become diffused in order to accommodate various international, transna-
tional, or non-territorial norms.”). 
106 See generally Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: 
Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (1995) (addressing concept 
of “new” sovereignty). 
107 Cohan, supra note 4, at 941. 
108 See id. at 942. 
109 See David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and World Politics 6, 7 (1983). 
110 See Cohan, supra note 4, at 943. 
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sovereignty—that is, that a state can do as it pleases in its own juris-
diction.111 
 An influential report issued in December 2001 by the Interna-
tional Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) sup-
ports this revolutionary view of human rights norms that operate as a 
vertical constraint on state sovereignty. 112 The ICISS report, entitled 
“The Responsibility to Protect,” highlighted the need to update the 
U.N. Charter to incorporate this new understanding of state sover-
eignty.113 The report noted a shift from the traditional concept of “sov-
ereignty as control” toward “sovereignty as responsibility in both inter-
nal functions and external duties.”114 According to the ICISS Report, if 
a population is suffering and its state is unwilling or unable to halt the 
suffering, then the principle of non-intervention yields to the interna-
tional responsibility to protect.115 The revolutionary version of human 
rights law, imposed on states through the general evolutionary trend in 
international law, has imposed additional restrictions on states, thereby 
eroding the traditional notion of exclusive state sovereignty.116 
B. International Criminal Law 
 The evolutionary movement in the international legal field has 
exercised tremendous influence in the area of international criminal 
law. The field itself is less revolutionary than international human 
rights law, as the idea of individual international responsibility for 
criminal acts was accepted several centuries ago.117 Early on, states rec-
ognized piracy as the first international crime, and sought to punish 
individuals who engaged in piracy, irrespective of such individuals’ state 
affiliation.118 Moreover, states held trials for war crimes as early as the 
fifteenth century, and enacted various legal codes prohibiting war 
                                                                                                                      
111 Forsythe, supra note 109, at 6, 7 (emphasis added). 
112 Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility To 
Protect: Report Of The Int’l Comm. On Intervention And State Sovereignty (2001), 
available at http://iciss.ca/pdf/commission-Report.pdf (last visited May 9, 2008) [hereinaf-
ter ICISS Report]; see also Max W. Mathews, Note, Tracking the Emergence of a New Interna-
tional Norm: The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur, 31 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 
137 (2008) (analyzing responsibility to protect). 
113 See ICISS Report, supra note 112 §§ 2.16–.27. 
114 Id. § 2.14. 
115 Id. §§ 2.14–.15. 
116 See id. 
117 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 607. 
118 Id. 
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crimes in subsequent years. 119 During the nineteenth century, states 
negotiated several treaties criminalizing trading in slaves, an act com-
mitted by individuals, not states.120 
 With the rise of human rights norms, the field of international 
criminal law came to encompass additional international violations hav-
ing to do with attacks on human dignity.121 Atrocities committed in civil 
wars became criminalized on an international level. 122  To this end, 
throughout the 1990s, the linkage of human rights protection with in-
ternational criminal responsibility contributed to the creation of several 
international criminal courts charged with prosecuting individuals ac-
cused of specific crimes.123 Moreover, specific criminal offenses have 
been affirmatively recognized as contrary to international law, and as 
providing substantive jurisdiction for prosecution in one of the newly 
created international criminal tribunals. 124  The globalization forces 
behind the transformation of international law exercised an expansive 
influence on the field of international criminal law by broadening its 
horizons and enlarging the idea of global accountability for heinous 
individual crimes.125 
                                                                                                                      
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. (noting that state and non-state actors have accepted, over last several centuries, 
that individuals may be responsible under international law for acts against human dig-
nity). 
122 Protocol Additional (No. 2) to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II] (creating rules governing internal armed con-
flicts). 
123 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Es-
tablish a Permanent International Court, 10 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 11, 39–50 (1997) (discussing 
creation of new international tribunals in 1990s). 
124 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 653. The ICTY, for example, specifically recog-
nized that states had accepted that certain violations of customary international humani-
tarian law created individual responsibility. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, De-
cision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 128–134 (Oct. 2, 
1995). 
125 The globalization movement also influenced the idea of international criminal re-
sponsibility by providing more alternatives to domestic criminal prosecution of human 
rights offenders. In today’s globalized world, actors outside the relevant state may provide 
support to the offender’s home state; foreign states may consider prosecuting the offender 
themselves under various extra-territorial jurisdictional principles; and states may act to set 
up international tribunals to try such offenders. Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 608. 
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1. Creation of New International Courts 
 Although the idea of international criminal prosecutions gained 
popularity in the wake of World War II and the Nuremberg Tribunal,126 
a very limited number of such trials actually took place during the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century.127 The 1990s, however, witnessed a 
rebirth of the idea, beginning with the creation of several new interna-
tional criminal tribunals. 
 Following the bloody civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, the U.N. utilized its Chapter VII powers to create the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).128 These tribunals 
were charged with a specific mandate: to prosecute individuals accused 
of specific heinous offenses, such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity, that took place in the territory of the former Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda during a specific time period.129 The creation of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 followed the same evolu-
tionary trend of prosecuting individuals accused of extraordinarily hei-
nous crimes in an international forum.130 
 Although the jurisdictional mandates of these tribunals were 
strictly limited temporally, territorially, and substantively,131 they none-
theless represent a giant step toward solidifying the idea of individual 
international criminal responsibility, born in Nuremberg but put aside 
during the second half of the twentieth century.132 Under the tradi-
                                                                                                                      
126 The Nuremberg trials took place as part of the International Military Tribunal, es-
tablished through the London Charter. Id. at 609. 
127 Bassiouni, supra note 123, at 38–39 (noting that because of Cold War, very few in-
ternational prosecutions took place despite existence of many conflicts because “[j]ustice 
was the Cold War’s casualty”). 
128 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 652–53 (discussing creation of ICTY and ICTR); 
Mark S. Ellis, Combating Impunity and Enforcing Accountability as a Way to Promote Peace and 
Stability—The Role of International War Crimes Tribunals, 2 J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 111, 118–
19 (2006); see also Davis B. Tyner, Internationalization of War Crimes Prosecutions: Correcting the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s Folly in Tadic, 18 Fla. J. Int’l L. 
843, 853 (2006) (discussing creation of ICTY). 
129 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 653. 
130 See Milena Sterio, Seeking the Best Forum to Prosecute International War Crimes: Proposed 
Paradigms and Solutions, 18 Fla. J. Int’l L. 887, 895 (2006) (discussing creation of ICC). 
131 The ICTY and ICTR can prosecute individuals accused of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. The ICTY can consider any crimes committed in the former 
Yugoslavia after 1991, up to the present; whereas, the ICTR is confined to crimes in 
Rwanda in 1994. Both tribunals are to “wind down” and complete their work by 2010. 
Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 653, 656. 
132 See Bassiouni, supra note 123, at 112 (“[S]ince 1948, there have been few criminal 
investigations or prosecutions.”). 
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tional notion of international law, most types of individual criminal re-
sponsibility would be handled domestically under domestic law.133 For 
example, suppose a Canadian was murdered by a Swedish killer.134 His-
torically, the only recourse for the family of the Canadian victim was to 
ask the Canadian government to issue a diplomatic protest to the Swed-
ish government.135 Moreover, if a military dictator from a given country 
decided to exterminate a minority group, such acts would be seen as 
matters of purely domestic jurisdiction. 136  In other words, the con-
cerned state could, if it chose to do so, prosecute the military leader 
domestically. Practically speaking, such prosecutions never took place 
while the offending leader was still in power, and very rarely took place 
even after a change of regimes for a variety of reasons, including: fears 
of regional instability; lack of democracy in the new regime; need for 
national reconciliation; and lack of recognition of international crimi-
nal norms.137 
 The evolutionary movement that began transforming interna-
tional law played a dominant role in transforming the international 
criminal law field. With the notion that international law encompasses 
much more than purely inter-state relations, international criminal law 
gained freedom to explore the idea of criminalizing individual of-
fenses—typically handled in domestic fora—on an international level. 
The creation of international tribunals was a logical step in that direc-
                                                                                                                      
133 See Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 607 (describing phenomena of recognition of 
criminal responsibility under international law, which began as early as fifteenth century). 
As noted above, certain crimes had been internationalized early on, such as piracy and 
trading in slaves. See id. Nevertheless, most other crimes would be prosecuted within a do-
mestic criminal system. 
134 See generally J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations 276–87 (6th ed. 1963) (discussing 
traditional notion of state responsibility, including so-called diplomatic protection). 
135 See id. 
136 Austen L. Parrish, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 291, 294–96 (2006) (discussing traditional 
notion of state sovereignty as asserting that “[s]o long as a state did not cause harm outside 
its territory, international law had little to say about what a state did internally”). Under 
traditional notions of sovereignty, any domestic policy choices, even those as flagrant as the 
decision to exterminate a minority group, would be free from external or internal con-
straints. See Cohan, supra note 4, at 914–15 (discussing “Westphalian sovereignty,” or the 
right of a sovereign state to be left alone from external interference, and “domestic sover-
eignty,” or the right of a sovereign state to be free of internal interference). 
137 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 648. Regimes also often pass general amnesty laws 
exonerating government-sponsored atrocities. See Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old 
Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law, 87 Geo. L.J. 707, 720–29 (1999) (noting that An-
gola, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, the Ivory Coast, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Togo, and Uruguay all passed broad amnesty laws in 1990s). 
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tion, as it provided specific jurisdictions to handle criminal prosecu-
tions of individuals accused of international offenses.138 
 More recently, the field of international criminal law has trans-
formed itself once more by encompassing the idea of hybrid tribu-
nals—jurisdictions created by international agreement between the 
U.N. and the host country. These agreements mix local law in their 
otherwise internationally-oriented statutes and employ a mix of domes-
tic and international personnel. Examples of such tribunals include 
East Timor,139 the Special Court for Sierra Leone,140 the Iraqi High Tri-
bunal,141 and the Extra-Ordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
Tribunal. 142  These hybrid courts solidify the idea of international 
criminal responsibility while recognizing the need to involve aggressors’ 
home countries in the prosecution process, for substantive as well as 
practical reasons.143 Moreover, they exemplify globalization—the inter-
connectivity between local and global domains as well as the linkage 
between domestic and international matters.144 
2. Creation of New Offenses 
 With the rebirth of international criminal tribunals and their 
quick creation in the 1990s, it became crucial to define specific of-
fenses that would merit such high-profile prosecution in the interna-
                                                                                                                      
138 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 18 (describing establishment of new international 
tribunals in 1990s). 
139 See Ellis, supra note 128, at 121–25; see also Danielle Tarin, Note, Prosecuting Saddam 
and Bungling Transitional Justice in Iraq, 45 Va. J. Int’l L. 467, 522–25 (2005) (discussing 
East Timor court). 
140 See Sterio, supra note 130, at 895–99; see also Ellis, supra note 128, at 136–39 (discuss-
ing Special Court for Sierra Leone in context of an accountability policy in Liberia). 
141 For a discussion of the Iraqi High Tribunal, see generally Michael P. Scharf & 
Gregory S. Mcneal, Saddam on Trial: Understanding the Iraqi High Tribunal 
(2006); Tarin, supra note 139. The Iraqi High Tribunal is not a truly hybrid court because 
its seat is in Baghdad, its prosecutor is Iraqi, and its judges are all Iraqi. Thus, the Iraqi 
High Tribunal has been characterized as an “internationalized” domestic court because its 
statute and rules of procedure are modeled on the ICTR, ICTY, and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone. See Scharf & Mcneal, supra, at 57–59. 
142 For a discussion of the Cambodian court, see Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 656–
57; Ellis, supra note 128, at 125–28. 
143 Avril McDonald, Sierra Leone’s Shoestring Special Court, Int’l Rev. of the Red Cross, 
Mar. 2002, at 121, 121–124 (discussing distinct features of Special Court). 
144 See supra note 128 and accompanying text (providing a definition of globalization); 
see also Berman, supra note 1, at 540 (discussing use of hybrid courts in context of a discus-
sion on plural sources of legal authority, a phenomenon linked to globalization). 
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tional dimension. 145  International law, even in its most traditional 
form, encompassed the idea that individuals should be treated fairly 
during wartime.146 This notion logically follows the main premise of 
traditional international law: states, at peacetime, have unlimited sov-
ereignty within their territory.147 At wartime, however, states transcend 
their borders and encroach on other states’ sovereignty. Thus, special 
rules are needed to address situations in which jurisdictional lines be-
come blurred and territory no longer equals sovereignty.148 
 The multiple Hague Conventions stemming from the beginning of 
the twentieth century,149 the four Geneva Conventions negotiated in 
the wake of World War II,150 and the Conventions’ two Additional Pro-
tocols, 151 represent the bulk of international legal norms specifying 
codes of behavior during wartime, as they relate to both soldiers and 
civilians. These norms, crafted to handle traditional warfare where 
states and their armies fought in clearly delineated battlefields, proved 
insufficient in the face of modern wars—often brutal civil conflicts, in-
volving para-military groups, guerrillas, civilians, and interference from 
neighboring states.152 Recognizing this problem, drafters of the above-
mentioned international court statutes sought to criminalize offenses 
in a manner that would encompass specific conduct taking place in the 
                                                                                                                      
145 Yusuf Askar, Implementing International Humanitarian Law 84 (2004) (not-
ing importance of defining limits of individual criminal responsibility in ICTY and ICTR 
statutes). 
146 International law has long embraced the notion of jus in bello, commonly referred 
to as the law of war or international humanitarian law, which attempts to shield individuals 
from certain types of wartime harm, and which regulates the conduct of armed conflict. 
See Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 527. 
147 Parrish, surpa note 136, at 294–96. 
148 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 527 (describing development of law of war). 
149 “Hague law” refers to a series of conferences held in the Hague, producing a set of 
declarations and conventions, most notably in 1899 and 1907. Id. 
150 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 place numerous obligations on states to protect 
people in international armed conflict who are not actively engaged in hostilities. These 
people include the sick and the wounded (Convention No. 1), the sick and the wounded 
at sea (Convention No. 2), prisoners of war (Convention No. 3), and civilians (Convention 
No. 4). See generally Geneva Convention No. 4, supra note 101; Geneva Convention No. 3, 
supra note 101; Geneva Convention No. 2, supra note 101; Geneva Convention No. 1, supra 
note 101. In addition, Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 includes additional 
rules covering international conflicts, and Protocol II to the same conventions includes 
rules covering internal armed conflict. Protocol Additional (No. 1) to the Geneva Conven-
tions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol II, supra note 
122; see also Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 628, 638 (discussing subject matter of four 
Geneva Conventions). 
151 Protocol II supra note 122; Protocol I, supra note 150. 
152 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 537–38. 
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new type of warfare. The ICC, ICTY, and ICTR statutes relied on the 
Nuremberg Charter to criminalize genocide and war crimes.153 These 
statutes, however, expanded the Nuremberg idea of crimes against hu-
manity that criminalized this offense purely during wartime,154 into the 
notion of crimes against humanity applied equally to peace and war-
time and to the new types of warfare.155 
 Moreover, in the context of specific conflicts, statutes of some of 
the above tribunals adopted rules borrowed from domestic laws to 
criminalize conduct that was unique to the given war.156 Thus, the Spe-
cial Court for Sierra Leone statute gives the prosecutor the ability to 
indict individuals accused not only of the most heinous offenses, such 
as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, but also of of-
fenses specific to the civil war in Sierra Leone. These include offenses 
related to the abuse of girls, those related to the destruction of prop-
erty, and those related to the use of child soldiers.157 Similarly, the Ex-
traordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia criminalizes offenses 
such as the destruction of cultural property, crimes against internation-
ally protected persons pursuant to the Vienna Convention of 1961 on 
Diplomatic Relations, as well as crimes of homicide, torture, and reli-
gious persecution as defined in the Cambodian domestic penal code.158 
                                                                                                                      
153 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg art. 6, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 
(1945). 
154 Id. Under the Nuremberg Charter, the offense of crimes against humanity merely 
extended the offense of war crimes to the same category of protected person-civilian, so 
that crimes against humanity were reflections of an extension of war crimes. Thus, crimes 
committed before 1939 were excluded from prosecution under this offense. 
155 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 621. Thus, article 7 of the ICC Statute embraces 
the definition of Crimes Against Humanity without requiring any nexus between the crime 
and a specific war. Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 
(1998). The ICTY and ICTR statutes adopt a similar definition of crimes against humanity. 
See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda art. 3, 33 I.L.M. 1602, available at 
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute/2007.pdf, adopted by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994); Statute of the International Tribunal art. 5, 32 I.L.M. 1192, avail-
able at http://www.icls.de/dokumente/icty_statut.pdf, adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/827 (1993). 
156 Scharf & Mcneal, supra note 141, at 3 (noting that Iraqi High Tribunal’s jurisdic-
tion is comprised of a mix of international law crimes and domestic law crimes). 
157 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone arts. 4 & 5, available at https://www.sc-sl. 
org/scsl-statute.html; see also Jonathan H. Marks, Mending the Web: Universal Jurisdiction, Hu-
manitarian Intervention and the Abrogation of Immunity by the Security Council, 42 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L. 445, 480 (2004) (describing hybrid nature of Special Court’s statute, which 
encompasses international as well as domestic criminal offenses). 
158 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea 
arts. 3, 7, & 8, available at http://www.derechos.org/human-rights/seasia/doc/krlaw.html. 
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 The field of international criminal law, under the evolutionary 
influence of general international law, has thus transformed itself 
over the last two decades. The notion of inter-state relations as the 
governing mode of dialogue in international criminal law is no longer 
prevalent, and this field now governs individual criminal responsibility 
and extends to spheres traditionally left to purely domestic powers. 
C. Private International Law 
 The globalization movement has played a particularly dominant 
role in the world of commerce. Large and even mid-size commercial 
operators no longer deal with local or regional partners; today, they 
frequently engage in cross-border business, dealing with foreign enti-
ties. 159  Laws governing such cross-border transactions have changed 
correspondingly.160 We no longer deal with purely national commercial 
laws, but instead have to look for supra-national legal authority that has 
the power to regulate cross-border transactions.161 We have witnessed a 
rise of cross-border regulations, aiming to provide a legal framework 
for the globalized commercial world. At the same time, we have also 
witnessed a proliferation of actors. Traditionally, only states could con-
clude treaties, in which they could choose to protect their national 
business interests. 162  Nowadays, commercial treaties are being con-
cluded between states and foreign investors directly. 163  This pub-
lic/private merger in the field of cross-border commercial law epito-
mizes the entire shift of international law from a body of law governing 
inter-state relations, to a complex web of regulations concluded be-
tween state and non-state actors and governing private entity-state rela-
tions.164 
                                                                                                                      
159 Sterio, supra note 70, at 97. 
160 See id. 
161 Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Substance, 42 Va. J. 
Int’l L. 931, 942–54 (2002) (discussing ways in which “regulatory power traditionally en-
joyed by sovereign states has shifted” to supranational level, to private actors, and to “in-
formal networks constituted among sub state-level agencies in different countries”). 
162 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(1969) (defining treaty as “an international agreement concluded between states . . . gov-
erned by international law”). 
163 See Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 216–17 (discussing corporations and businesses 
as international actors). 
164 See Berman, supra note 1, at 550 (noting that private parties today exercise forms of 
governmentally authorized power). 
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1. Creation of New Cross-Border Regulations 
 Over the past few decades, several cross-border regulations have 
been concluded to provide a legal regime for international transactions 
involving commercial entities coming from two or more different 
states.165 In other words, in today’s inter-connected world, globalization 
has dictated a harmonization of substantive rules in specific fields. This 
harmonization supersedes national rules and undermines the tradi-
tional concept of state sovereignty. It also illustrates the complexity of 
modern international law in its transformed or globalized version. 
 In the law of sales, the U.N. Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG) was negotiated, representing a set of default rules that 
contracting parties refer to if their international sale contract are silent 
on certain issues.166 Under the CISG, transacting parties may opt out of 
any nation-state law and instead choose a sort of lex mercatoria to govern 
their interactions, dispensing altogether with the need to consult any 
state laws.167 
 In the field of international trade, the WTO already plays a hugely 
significant role, providing not only a body of substantive rules, but a 
dispute settlement mechanism as well, which encompasses state com-
mercial interests. 168  Under this mechanism, states act against each 
other like private commercial entities would in a typical private arbitra-
tion.169 Moreover, the WTO appellate tribunals seem to be creating an 
international common law of trade and amassing a body of legal rules 
that challenge traditional conceptions of state sovereignty and override 
domestic court decisions.170 Finally, NGOs and international civil soci-
                                                                                                                      
165 See id. at 520–23 (discussing undermining of public/private law distinction in field 
of private international law). 
166 See generally Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 52 Fed. 
Reg. 6262, 6264–80 (Mar. 2, 1987). 
167 See Berman, supra note 1, at 522; Clayton Gillette, The Law Merchant in the Modern 
Age: Institutional Design and International Usages Under the CISG, 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 157, 159 
(2004). 
168 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 834; Berman, supra note 1, at 521–22. 
169 Claudio Cocuzza & Andrea Forabosco, Are States Relinquishing Their Sovereign Rights? 
The GATT Dispute Settlement Process in a Globalized Economy, 4 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 161, 
169 (1996); see also William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements, 19 Fordham Int’l L.J. 427 (1995). 
170 See Bhala, supra note 29, at 850 (“In brief, there is a body of international common 
law on trade emerging as a result of adjudication by the WTO’s Appellate Body.”); Lori M. 
Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: The WTO, NAFTA and International 
Harmonization of Standards, 50 U. Kan. L. Rev. 823, 825 (2002) (“Expansive international 
rules strongly enforced through international dispute resolution bodies have significant 
implications for the laws and policies domestic governments may establish, as well as for 
the processes domestic governments use to make policy.”). 
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ety groups have become active in the WTO process, attempting to use 
the appellate panels to further their specific goals, particularly in envi-
ronmental and labor law.171 
 Also in the field of transnational trade, NAFTA plays a dominant 
role in the North American continent.172 Under NAFTA, private inves-
tors can challenge a NAFTA government’s regulatory decision directly 
within the NAFTA dispute resolution system, thereby again challenging 
the notion of state sovereignty.173 In the field of intellectual property, 
WIPO functions similarly to the WTO.174 Moreover, numerous cross-
border regulations exist in the securities and tax fields, which are par-
ticularly impacted by the globalization movement.175 Finally, interna-
tional trade association groups and their standard-setting organs wield 
tremendous influence in creating voluntary guidelines that become 
industry norms and often have strong public policy ramifications.176 
 All of the above involve cross-border regulatory rules in the form 
of treaties. All of the above were negotiated by state parties, but were 
heavily influenced by private commercial interests, epitomizing again 
the private/public merger and the complexity of today’s globalized 
international law. According to Michael Reisman, the term “private” 
in “private international law” is a “misnomer, for what is transpiring is 
                                                                                                                      
171 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theories of Justice, Human Rights and the Constitution of 
International Markets, 37 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 407, 455 (2003). 
172 See Greg Block, Trade and Environment in the Western Hemisphere: Expanding the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation in the Americas, 33 Envtl. L. 501, 507 
(2003). 
173 See id. 
174 See Jeffrey K. Walker, The Demise of the Nation-State, the Dawn of New Paradigm Welfare, 
a Future for the Profession of Arms, 51 A.F. L. Rev. 323, 327 (2001) (discussing how organiza-
tions such as WTO and WIPO have encroached on state sovereignty and that latter sets 
and enforces international trademark and patent policy). 
175 See generally Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal Securities Regulation in the New 
Millennium (Wayne State Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 08-05, 
2008) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1080087 (noting impact of globalization on 
securities regulation); Philipp Genschel, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Viability 
of the Welfare State (Max Planck Inst. for the Study of Soc’ys, Working Paper 01/1, 2001) 
available at http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp01–1/wp01–1.html (discuss-
ing influence of globalization on taxation). 
176 Berman, supra note 1, at 522–23. In the chemical industry, for example, the Cana-
dian Chemical Manufacturers Association and the International Counsel of Chemical As-
sociations have set industry standards in conjunction with other NGOs and environmental 
organizations. See Lee A. Tavis, Corporate Governance and the Global Social Void, 35 Vand. J. 
Transnat’l L. 487, 508–09 (2002). As another example, the Fair Labor Association has 
created standards now accepted as the norm in the apparel industry. See Fair Labor Ass’n, 
Workplace Code of Conduct and Principles of Monitoring, available at http://www.fair 
labor.org/conduct. 
242 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 31:213 
a fundamental interstate competition for power that falls squarely 
within the province of public international law.” 177 Private interna-
tional law has thus transformed itself from a set of transnational rules 
governing non-state, commercial entities, to a body of supra-national 
laws and regulations, which govern relations among many different 
state and non-state entities. 
2. Expanded Role of Non-State Commercial Actors 
 Following the rise of cross-border regulations, typically negotiated 
and concluded among states, private actors became more involved in 
international commerce, attempting to exercise a direct influence on 
states and to obtain favorable treatment in their business endeavors.178 
Private investors started lobbying their own governments to conclude 
so-called bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with developing coun-
tries. 179 Although BITs represent a traditional form of international 
lawmaking—treaties negotiated among states—they signal a shift in the 
type of actors present on the international scene. 180  BITs truly are 
about investors’ interests and their power to lobby and persuade their 
governments to conclude favorable treaties with foreign nations. They 
demonstrate that powerful private interests can act and influence the 
international treaty process, and that non-state actors have gained an 
important seat in the world of international relations.181 
 Following the proliferation of BITs, private investors began work-
ing directly with foreign nations on various financing projects, typically 
                                                                                                                      
177 W. Michael Reisman, Introduction to Jurisdiction in International Law, at xi–xii 
(W. Michael Reisman ed., 1999). 
178 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 860 (noting most of growth in international pro-
duction over past decade has come from cross-border mergers and acquisitions). 
179 Id. at 861 (noting that several European states are entering into BITs with develop-
ing world, and that United States launched its own BIT program in 1977 and began to 
enter into BITs with developing states in 1980s). 
180 As noted above, traditionally only states could be subject to international law—
whoever wronged a person indirectly harmed his state. The harmed individual had to per-
suade his state to adopt his grievance on the international level against the offending state. 
The pursuit of such claims by states in the commercial world is problematic for political, 
diplomatic, and foreign policy reasons. Thus, with the rise of foreign investment, pressures 
built for alternative mechanisms, and BITs, which provide strong investor protection as 
well as a dispute settlement procedure, are one of the responses. Id. at 869. 
181 Private investors also have important protection, besides BITs, under the ICSID 
Convention. Under this Convention, private parties have direct access to an international 
arbitral forum to pursue claims against host states—namely, the ICSID, an institution 
closely associated with the World Bank. Id. at 870. 
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linked to building infrastructure in developing countries.182 Private in-
vestors started concluding commercial contracts directly with foreign 
governments that specify the investors’ role in the particular building 
project. 183  This phenomenon, typically referred to as “project fi-
nance,”184 demonstrates that everything about traditional commercial 
law has changed. For one, commercial agreements are no longer nego-
tiated simply by states, but they also involve private entities as direct 
contracting partners.185 Additionally, the subject matter of treaties has 
shifted from detailing particular state interests and trade-offs, to focus-
ing on investment relations and the rights and liabilities of private in-
vestors.186 Finally, these project finance agreements signal that states are 
willing to relinquish a tremendous amount of their sovereign power to 
private entities.187 For example, states will allow private operators to run 
their roads, dams, factories, and plants.188 Globalization, in this context, 
has impacted state behavior in a powerful way, by transferring sover-
eign-type powers to non-state actors and by involving the latter heavily 
in the commercial negotiation process. 
III. The Impact of Globalized International Law 
 As described above, international law has transformed itself over 
the past few decades and now represents a complex body of global 
rules and regulations that apply to a vast field of state and non-state ac-
tors.189 Although the latter phenomenon is relatively non-controversial 
and has already received significant scholarly attention,190 the relevant 
question for the purposes of this Article is whether such globalized in-
ternational law has had a significant impact on international legal ac-
                                                                                                                      
182 Dinesh D. Banani, Note, International Arbitration and Project Finance in Developing 
Countries: Blurring the Public/Private Distinction, 26 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 355, 358 
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tors. First, to what extent, if any, has globalized international law af-
fected state behavior; and, second, to what extent, if any, has it affected 
individual behavior? 
A. State Behavior 
 International law now displays a globalized shape: it covers a wide 
variety of legal fields, it encompass a myriad of different rules and regu-
lations, and it governs state as well as non-state behavior.191 In light of 
such a radical transformation, the relevant inquiry focuses on under-
standing how such transformation has affected state actors, and 
whether their behavior on the international scene has changed in con-
siderable ways.192 Thus, this Article examines two different phenomena 
in this Part: (1) whether states comply with globalized international law 
more willingly than they did decades ago, when international law ex-
hibited a more traditional form; and (2) whether states are more prone 
to incorporating globalized international law into their own domestic 
laws or to relying on globalized international law in their international 
relations. All these observations can be simplistically explained by the 
fact that lines between international and domestic legal domains have 
become so blurred that states no longer view international law as the 
“enemy.” 
1. Willing Compliance Phenomenon 
 Because international law is omni-present in state life, it seems that 
it no longer meets the same resentment it did in some legal cultures 
throughout the past century.193 Moreover, it seems that Louis Henkin’s 
famed observation, that most states obey their international legal obli-
gations most of the time, is becoming truer by the day.194 Particularly 
                                                                                                                      
191 See Cohan, supra note 4, at 954 (“Today there is a veritable panoply of treaties, re-
gional agreements, U.N. Declarations, and other protocols that globalization is pushing 
toward a[n] orderless world so that domestic actions in one state can have rippling effects 
that impact other states.”). 
192 See id. 
193 The United States, for example, was overtly hostile to international law at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, as exemplified in its isolationist doctrine, which dominated 
U.S. foreign policy between the two world wars, and resulted in U.S. refusal to join the 
League of Nations. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 123, at 20 (“By then, the United States was 
in the throes of isolationism, with its rejection of President Woodrow Wilson’s internationalist 
views, evidenced by Congress’ refusal to have the United States become part of the League of 
Nations.”); WBUR, U.S. Foreign Policy, 1776–2001, http://www.wbur.org/special/special- 
coverage/feature_isolation.asp (last visited May 10, 2008). 
194 See Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave 320–21 (2d ed. 1979). 
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relevant, however, is the reason behind such state compliance.195 This 
Article argues that the evolution of international law into a globalized 
force majeure has instilled a legal sense of obligation in states toward this 
new globalized international law. Because international law no longer 
entails mainly state relations, any state behavior on the international 
scene today necessarily affects a wide range of actors. Thus, states, when 
they (mis)behave, have to account for a variety of consequences that 
their (mis)behavior will produce: they have to envision the impacted 
state, as well as non-state actors; they have to calculate whether any of 
their international legal obligations under the myriad of international 
treaties they may be party to will be triggered; and they have to fear any 
grievances that may be asserted against them in a variety of possible ju-
risdictions. When such a complicated calculus must be performed be-
fore any state action, this Article argues that states are likely more will-
ing to take international law into account, or to at least try not to 
disrespect it in a blatant manner. 
 It may be difficult to call such state compliance with international 
law “willing” when any noncompliance may result in serious sanctions, 
and when the “willingness” may in fact stem from fear of sanctions and 
consequences. This Article argues, however, that the repetition of com-
pliance with international law, although caused at first by a threat of 
sanctions, may ultimately result in a new norm or custom of state be-
havior, whereby states would truly obey international law from a sense 
of legal obligation and from a tradition of long-standing and uniform 
practice of doing so. 
 For example, after the terrorist attacks on the United States on 
September 11, 2001, the Bush administration chose to detain so-called 
enemy combatants at the Guantanamo military base in Cuba.196 Under 
                                                                                                                      
195 There are many theories of compliance with international law, the major ones be-
ing institutionalism, constructivism, the New Haven School, a Kantian model, and a mana-
gerial model. See Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 30–31; see also Koh, supra note 36, at 566–
70 (discussing emergence of transnational law as a reason for compliance with interna-
tional law). See generally Berman, supra note 22 (arguing that approach to international law 
should be a mixture of Robert Cover’s legal pluralism and insights of the New Haven 
School); Harold Hongju Koh, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: Judicial Internalization into Domestic 
Law of the Customary International Law Norm Against Torture, in International Law Sto-
ries, supra note 32, at 45, 67–73 (using Filartiga to illustrate a key claim of the “New New 
Haven School of International Law” about application of international law by individual 
countries). 
196 See Oona A. Hathaway, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Domestic Enforcement of International 
Law, in International Law Stories, supra note 32, at 229, 234 (describing establishment 
of U.S. military detention center at Guantanamo Bay); see also Dunoff et al., supra note 
35, at 999 (discussing establishment of Guantanamo detainee program). 
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a traditional version of international law, the United States would be 
concerned only about the impact this detention had on the parent 
state of the detainees. 197 Other than those states, the United States 
would evidently be free to treat the detainees as it wished, within the 
purview of its domestic law.198 The globalization movement that has 
transformed international law brings a major change in the above 
analysis. 
 First, the United States must now consider not only relevant state 
actors, but also a number of non-state and supra-state actors. In addi-
tion to concerns raised by the home states of detained individuals, the 
United States has received a vast number of complaints about the 
Guantanamo detention facility from a variety of NGOs, regional state 
organizations, and human rights protection bodies.199 Moreover, the 
United States can no longer consider only whether the detention pro-
gram is legal under its domestic law; it must also consider all relevant 
international conventions to which it is a member.200 Thus, the United 
States could very well interpret the detention program as legal under its 
Constitution and Bill of Rights, but the same conclusion may not hold 
true under the four Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, or 
the Torture Convention. To complicate things further, the evolutionary 
process of international law has elevated certain legal principles to the 
status of customary norms, which bind all states in a conclusory man-
ner without room for derogations or reservations, even if states are not 
parties to specific treaties codifying the legal norms.201 Thus, if U.S. 
treatment of Guantanamo detainees were to violate a customary norm 
                                                                                                                      
197 For a general discussion of the difference between the traditional version of interna-
tional law, and the globalized or evolutionary version of international law, see supra Part II. 
198 See Cohan, supra note 4, at 914–15 (discussing “Westphalian sovereignty,” or the 
right of a sovereign state to be left alone from external interference). 
199 See Hathaway, supra note 196, at 235–36 (describing criticism Bush Administration 
received because of alleged abuse of Guantanamo detainees). 
200 See id. at 235. The Bush Administration effectively claimed that the Geneva Conven-
tions did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda. This shows that the Bush Administration, 
although adamant about its desire to continue the Guantanamo detention program, saw 
the need to justify its actions internationally, and to prove that they were in compliance 
with U.S. international legal obligations. See id. It is also worth noting that the U.S. Su-
preme Court—possibly because of domestic and international criticism of the Bush Ad-
ministration—ultimately held that the military commissions designed to try al Qaeda de-
tainees violated Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
201 See Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 78–81 (providing general discussion of interna-
tional custom). States can choose to “opt out” of an emerging customary norm by object-
ing to the rule as it develops. Id. at 78. Once a norm reaches the status of international 
custom, however, all states are bound by it. Id. 
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of international law, such treatment would be a violation of interna-
tional law, although legal under domestic law. 
 Finally, the United States must both consider the effect of its ac-
tions on the proliferating number of relevant actors impacted by its be-
havior and the implicated legal norms, as well as account for a number 
of jurisdictions that may choose to challenge the United States as a 
country, or some of its leaders, if U.S. behavior becomes so offensive as 
to warrant judicial proceedings. States may assert grievances against the 
United States in the ICJ, a traditional form of state-to-state complaint 
procedure. 202  Additionally, state and non-state actors may complain 
about the United States to committees or judicial bodies set up under 
various international conventions, regional organizations, or other 
human rights protection mechanisms.203 Such state and non-state ac-
tors may directly target top U.S. political leaders through criminal 
complaints brought in foreign domestic courts,204 or even international 
courts, under their expansive jurisdiction statutes.205 Thus, in light of 
all the legal challenges such a program may face on the international 
level, this Article argues that a country like the United States should at 
least think twice before instituting such a program as Guantanamo. 
 In the specific case of the United States, international law has not 
necessarily changed the Guantanamo policy at stake. International law 
has however, certainly provoked a vigorous public debate at both the 
international and national levels concerning the legality of the pol-
icy.206 The existence of such a debate signals the erosion of state sover-
                                                                                                                      
202 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 
993. ICJ jurisdiction is based on state consent, so that any exercise of jurisdiction by the 
tribunal would have to be based on a treaty or on ad hoc consent. See id. 
203 See Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 450 (describing Torture Convention mecha-
nism); Grossman, supra note 32, at 81–83; David Seymour & Jennifer Tooze, The Soering 
Case: The Long Reach of the European Convention on Human Rights, in International Law 
Stories, supra note 32, at 115, 118–19 (describing Convention on Human Rights’ com-
plaint procedure whereby individuals can bring claims against states). 
204 See Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 383. For example, a complaint was filed with 
the German Federal Prosecutor’s Office against U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rums-
feld and other government officials by a U.S.-based NGO and several Iraqi citizens alleging 
that the officials were responsible for unlawful acts committed against detainees at the Abu 
Ghraib prison and elsewhere. Id. The complaint was brought under the German universal 
jurisdiction statute. Id. Although this complaint was ultimately dismissed by the German 
Prosecuting Attorney, it nonetheless signals the possibility that U.S. leaders may face 
prosecution in a foreign domestic court. See id. 
205 For a discussion of universal jurisdiction statutes, see supra Part I.D. 
206 Cohan, supra note 4, at 942 (“Subsequently, human rights and civil liberties organi-
zations, politicians, and newspapers brought further pressure upon the Bush Administra-
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eignty brought about by the evolutionary process that has been trans-
forming international law. This erosion of state sovereignty translates 
itself into a heightened level of compliance with international law. Al-
though compliance might be a direct product of a pragmatic calculus, 
whereby states realize it may be strategically advantageous for them to 
obey an international rule, this Article argues that it nonetheless signals 
a phenomenon of willing legal obedience. Continuous repetition of 
willing state compliance with international law may instill a profound 
sense of legal obligation in states’ behavior in the years to come. 
2. State Reliance on International Law Domestically and in 
International Relations 
 Willing compliance with international law has already shaped state 
behavior in two ways.207 First, states seem willing to comply with inter-
national law on a new level—by relying on it directly in domestic legal 
arenas. Second, states seem eager to rely on international law to justify 
specific actions in international relations with other states or entities. 
 Traditionally, only a monist system encompasses international law 
as part of domestic law.208 In a dualist system, a particular international 
legal norm must first be incorporated into domestic law by a specific 
statute. Similarly, in a traditional system, national jurisdictions are in-
dependent of the ICJ, and the ICJ is not supposed to function as a su-
pra-national entity. 209  Yet, the globalization of international law has 
blurred these lines as well. Because international law touches on so 
many aspects of everyday life, and now pertains to issues that had been 
traditionally left to the realm of domestic law, when asked to resolve 
such issues, domestic courts are increasingly faced with international 
norms or rulings by the ICJ or other supra-national courts.210 This is 
particularly true in the human rights legal field. 
                                                                                                                      
tion to close the [Guantanamo] detention center.”); see also Hathaway, supra note 196, at 
236 (noting that Bush administration faces pressure to close Guantanamo). 
207 See supra Part III.A.1. 
208 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 267–68. 
209 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 203, art. 36. Under the ICJ 
Statute, the tribunal’s jurisdiction is based solely on state consent. Id. 
210 See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 486--99 (1989). In So-
ering, the European Court of Human Rights held that extradition of a German national 
accused of murder from the United Kingdom to the United States breached article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. Extradition would violate this article, which 
bans torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, because the defendant 
would be subject to the death penalty and “death row phenomenon” (the psychological 
degradation caused by living on death row). See id. 
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 For example, litigation under the Alien Tort Statute in the United 
States, revived in the Filartiga case,211 centers around violations of the 
law of nations. Thus, U.S. domestic courts are called on to decide when 
there has been a violation of international law that would warrant dam-
ages in the domestic legal system.212 General Augusto Pinochet’s extra-
dition proceedings between the United Kingdom and Spain required 
domestic courts, particularly in the United Kingdom, to interpret the 
multilateral Torture Convention and how its diplomatic immunity pro-
vision would affect Great Britain’s legal obligations vis-à-vis the relevant 
parties.213 More recently, an Oklahoma criminal court specifically relied 
on an ICJ ruling214 in a case involving the claim that the United States 
had violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna 
Convention).215 The Oklahoma court gave specific deference to the 
ICJ’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention and held the United 
States was bound by the Vienna Convention, and more importantly, by 
the ICJ interpretation thereof.216 Thus, on a judicial level, states, and in 
particular their judges, seem more willing to rely on international law 
in reaching everyday decisions because international law now governs 
and influences a growing variety of legal areas.217 
                                                                                                                      
211 See Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
212 See Koh, supra note 36, at 65–66 (describing an era of “‘transnational public law liti-
gation,’ a novel and expanding effort by state and individual plaintiffs to fuse international 
legal rights with domestic legal remedies”). 
213 See Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), (2000) 1 A.C. 
147, 148--49 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
214 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 
1 (Mar. 31). The ICJ held that the United States breached its obligation under article 
36(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to ensure that Mexican consu-
lar officials can communicate with their nationals and, under article 36(1)(c), have the 
right to visit their nationals in detention. Id. ¶ 153. The ICJ held that “the remedy to make 
good these violations should consist in an obligation on the United States to permit review 
and reconsideration of these nationals’ cases by the [U.S.] courts . . . with a view to ascer-
taining whether in each case the violation of Article 36 . . . caused actual prejudice to the 
defendant in the process of administration of criminal justice.” Id. ¶ 121. 
215 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
216 See Torres v. State, No. PCD-04–442, 2004 WL 3711623, (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 
2004). Judge Chapel stated that his court was, without any doubt, bound by the Vienna 
Convention, and thus also bound to give full faith and credit to the ICJ’s Avena decision. 
Id. at *1–5. 
217 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 29 (alleging that both “breadth” and “depth” of in-
ternational law have increased). The U.S. Supreme Court has shown a particular willing-
ness to consider international law. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court determined that the 
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause prohibited the execution of 
any offender under the age of sixteen at the time the crime was committed. The Court 
stated that this view was consistent with views expressed by “other nations that share our 
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 Additionally, states seem more willing to rely on international law 
on a diplomatic level. In their international relations, states like to have 
the international law “crutch” and be able to pronounce the legality of 
their actions under international law. Because international law now 
touches on so many legal areas, states seem to rely on it in many more 
aspects of their diplomacy. International law experts have taken up 
predominant positions in governments, and virtually every foreign pol-
icy or diplomacy decision is scrutinized for its coherence under inter-
national law.218 
 For example, when NATO countries decided to launch air strikes 
on the territory of the former Yugoslavia because of then-President 
Milosevic’s oppressive rule of the province of Kosovo, they sought U.N. 
Security Council approval for their use of force.219 Even when the U.N. 
fell short of approving such use of force, NATO countries still sought to 
justify their actions on the ground of international necessity, 220  al-
                                                                                                                      
Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European commu-
nity.” 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988). In Roper v. Simmons, another case interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment in connection with a juvenile offender, the Court wrote that it was appropri-
ate to refer “to the laws of other countries and to international authorities.” 543 U.S. 551, 
575 (2005). The Court specifically considered the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, which the United States has not ratified, and which bans capital punishment for 
crimes committed by juveniles under eighteen. See id. at 576. The Court further stated, 
“The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide 
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.” Id. at 578. Even Justice 
O’Connor, in her dissent, acknowledged that “[o]ver the course of nearly half a century, 
the Court has consistently referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its as-
sessment of evolving standards of decency.” Id. at 604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 Note, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court has recently shown skepticism regard-
ing the enforceability of international law in domestic courts, holding that the Vienna 
Convention was not self-executing and that the U.S. President could not order states to 
abide by ICJ rulings. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1351 (2008). This decision does 
not imply that international law will be entirely displaced from our judicial dialogue; 
rather, this decision may simply reflect the notion that, in most cases, congressional action 
must be taken in order to ratify international law and implement it domestically. 
218 Guillaume Sacriste & Antoine Vauchez, The Force of International Law: Lawyers’ Di-
plomacy on the International Scene in the 1920s, 32 L. & Soc. Inquiry 83, 87 (2007) (observ-
ing existence of “gentlemen-politicians at law,” who are international legal experts working 
as advisors to their governments). 
219 John J. Merriam, Note, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 33 Case W. 
Res. J. Int’l L. 111, 144 (2001) (noting that NATO chose to act unilaterally in Kosovo 
because Security Council was deadlocked). NATO members ultimately decided not to seek 
U.N. Security Council approval for their action in Kosovo because of Russia’s threatened 
veto. Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 940. 
220 See Press Release, Javier Solana, Secretary-General of NATO, NATO Press Release 
040 (March 23, 1999). NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, in his statement announc-
ing the start of air strikes on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, referred to 
“military action . . . intended to support the political aims of the international commu-
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though, arguably, NATO members were acting within their jurisdiction 
and had at least regional authority to act.221 This signifies that interna-
tional law truly matters, and that powerful organizations like NATO 
would rather comply with international law, taking action that is not 
authorized internationally only when deemed truly necessary. For ex-
ample, the U.S. government sought U.N. Security Council approval for 
both Gulf Wars, even though the United States had the military capac-
ity to act unilaterally and had invoked self-defense grounds, which 
would have justified the use of force without Security Council ap-
proval.222 It can be argued that the United States sought U.N. affirma-
tion for strategic or diplomatic reasons, but it can be equally argued 
that part of the affirmation process included a belief in the necessity of 
compliance with international law. 
B. Individual Behavior 
 The above-described calculus that states now perform when faced 
with assessing the validity of their behavior in light of globalized inter-
national law also pertains to individuals.223 In other words, in the same 
manner that states’ behavior seems curtailed by the evolving and ex-
panding forces of international law, individual rights appear to be gain-
ing greater protection from state intrusion. Thus, the evolution and 
globalization of international law that has eroded state sovereignty has 
provided a sphere of protection to the individual—a sort of a buffer 
zone between individual rights and states’ prerogatives to regulate indi-
vidual behavior. Individuals, in this new spectrum of protection stem-
                                                                                                                      
nity,” “humanitarian catastrophe,” and “instability spreading in the region,” but never 
evoked a specific legal ground to justify the invasion. Id. 
221 North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. NATO has 
jurisdiction in Europe and is charged with maintaining peace and security on that conti-
nent by enabling member countries to exercise collective self-defense if one or more of 
such member countries are under an armed attack. See id.; see also Carter et al., supra 
note 19, at 549 (describing role of NATO). 
222 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 891 (noting that United States sought U.N. Secu-
rity Council authorization to use force in First Gulf War); id. at 894–95 (discussing issue of 
whether United States could have legally used force in First Gulf War in absence of Secu-
rity Council authorization, on ground of self-defense); id. at 905–08 (describing U.S. ef-
forts to obtain Security Council authorization to use force in second Gulf War, and, once 
efforts failed, its ultimate decision to use force without Security Council approval). Note 
also that the United States, as well as its allies in the second Gulf War, attempted to justify 
legally their decision to use force in various Security Council resolutions. Id. at 908–09. 
This exemplifies the importance of international legal justification for controversial ac-
tions on the international level, even for powerful countries like the United States. See id. 
223 See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing “willing compliance” phenomenon whereby states 
comply with their international legal obligations more willingly today). 
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ming from globalized international law, now have different expecta-
tions about what states can do to them, as well as newly created rights 
enforceable in various courts of law.224 
1. Expanded Individual Expectations in the Face of Globalized 
International Law 
 Individuals today expect more protection from international law. 
Because international law has become omni-present in everyday life, 
individuals can find a protectionist international legal norm in almost 
every aspect of their lives. For example, international human rights 
norms protect the individual from undue state interference with basic 
rights, such as the rights to be free of torture, to have one’s human 
dignity respected, to have counsel appointed, to vote, and to receive a 
general education.225 International labor laws protect individual work-
ers and place limits on the rights of their employers.226 International 
environmental laws provide the individual with a healthy living envi-
ronment.227 International tax laws ensure that individuals do not have 
to pay their taxes multiple times if they are involved in international 
transactions.228 
                                                                                                                      
224 See infra Part III.B.1. 
225 See generally ICCPR, supra note 81; ICESCR, supra note 81; Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, supra note 81. Many of these basic human rights stem from the so-called 
International Bill of Rights, consisting of the Universal Declaration, the ICCPR, and the 
ICESCR. See generally ICCPR, supra note 81; ICESCR, supra note 81; Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, supra note 81. 
226 David M. Trubek, Emergence of Transnational Labor Law, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 725, 727 
(2006) (discussing “transnational labor law” or a regime of protection of workers’ rights). 
The International Labour Organization has maintained and developed international labor 
standards. For a complete database of conventions and recommendations setting forth 
international labor standards, see ILOLEX: Database of International Labour Standards, 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm (last visited May 10, 2008). 
227 See, e.g., Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, U.N. 
Conference on Environment and Development, Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1, reprinted in 
31 I.L.M. 874 (1992); Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, 
June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972). 
228 See generally Internal Revenue Serv., U.S. Tax Treaties (2007) (describing tax 
exemptions provided by U.S. treaties), available at www.irs.gov/pb/irs-pdf/p901.pdf; HM 
Revenue & Customs, Digest of Double Taxation Treaties (2007) (describing double 
taxation treaties to which United Kingdom is party), available at www.hmrc.gov.uk/cnr/ 
dtdigest.pdf. Numerous countries have concluded bilateral taxation treaties exempting 
their citizens or residents from being subject of double taxation, which occurs when two or 
more taxes may need to be paid for the same asset, financial transaction and/or income, 
arising from an overlap between different countries’ tax laws and jurisdictions. EU mem-
ber states have concluded a multilateral agreement on information exchange. This means 
that they will each report (to their counterparts in each other jurisdiction) a list of those 
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 Such a protectionist structure directly affects individuals by provid-
ing a shield, a web of rules and regulations that ensure individuals are 
not unnecessarily burdened by the state. Unsurprisingly, individual ex-
pectations have changed. Individuals no longer believe in absolute state 
sovereignty. Individuals today can easily consult international law on 
many different aspects of their lives. When faced with a question of 
state powers—e.g., can my state do this to me?—individuals are likely to 
look to international law as a shield and to invoke international legal 
norms to curb state behavior.229 Most importantly, individuals are likely 
to invoke specific international legal norms as bestowing certain rights 
on them, and as taking away such rights from their home states.230 
2. Newly Created Individual Rights in Light of Globalized 
International Law 
 The globalization forces that have transformed international law 
and confined state behavior as well as expanded individual expecta-
tions, have also affected specific individual rights.231 Individual rights 
are typically created by domestic legal systems. These are known as 
private, judicially enforceable rights.232 In a dualist legal system, in-
ternational law needs to be specifically incorporated into domestic law 
                                                                                                                      
savers who have claimed exemption from local taxation on grounds of not being a resident 
of the state where the income arises. These savers should have declared that foreign in-
come in their own country of residence, so any difference suggests tax evasion. See Euro-
pean Commission, Taxation and Customs Union, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/ 
taxation/gen_info/tax_policy/index_en.htm (last visited May 15, 2008) (providing over-
view of EU tax policies). 
229 See, e.g., Bowman v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1998) (concerning U.K. 
citizen claiming campaign contribution laws violated her free speech rights under Conven-
tion for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). 
230 See, e.g., id. As a corollary to this protectionist nature of globalized international law, it 
is important to note that the evolution of certain international legal fields, such as interna-
tional criminal law, has expanded individual liability, thus imposing additional limitations on 
individual behavior. For example, the concept of international criminal responsibility evolved 
over the latter half of the twentieth century, and was implemented particularly in the 1990s in 
the judicial proceedings that have taken place in the ICTY and ICTR. See supra Part III.B; see 
also Askar, supra note 145, at 84–112 (discussing different types of individual criminal respon-
sibility as they exist in ICTY, ICTR, and ICC statutes). For literature on the work of the ICTY 
and ICTR and their role in implementing the notion of individual criminal responsibility, see 
Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court, 98 A.J.I.L. 407 
(2004); Dermot Groome, Book Review, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 100 
A.J.I.L. 993 (2006); Theodor Meron, Centennial Essay: Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes 
by International Tribunals, 100 A.J.I.L. 551 (2006). 
231 See supra Parts III.A & B.1. 
232 For a discussion of private, judicially enforceable rights, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Fed-
eral Judicial Power and the International Legal Order, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 59. 
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by the passage of specific statutes; thus, an international legal norm 
may only protect private, individual rights to the extent that the in-
corporating domestic statute allows.233 This result, however, seems to 
have been somewhat undermined by recent litigation challenging this 
traditionalist conception and seeking to establish that individuals can 
sometimes rely on international law directly to have their individual 
rights protected in a domestic court of law.234 
 Several examples of such litigation occurred in the United States, a 
dualist legal system. There had been significant judicial debate over the 
issue of whether article 36 of the Vienna Convention creates a private, 
judicially enforceable right.235 Litigation in the United States centered 
around the question of whether private plaintiffs could directly rely on 
this international convention to have their private rights enforced and 
protected by U.S. courts.236 Although the majority of the Court chose 
not to answer this question directly in the latest case it heard on the 
issue,237 the dissent strongly pointed out that the Vienna Convention is 
a self-executing treaty, and that its provisions are such that “they are 
intended to set forth standards that are judicially enforceable.”238 Al-
though the majority left the issue unanswered, the dissent suggested it 
would be prudent to let the individual rely on this international treaty 
directly, indicating a desire to recognize the importance of interna-
tional protectionist norms on the rights of the individual.239 
 In Europe, such a shift already occurred in the second half on the 
twentieth century. There, individual rights are specifically protected 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, and individuals 
can bring specific grievances against their home countries in the Euro-
                                                                                                                      
233 Dunoff et al., supra note 35, at 268. 
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pean Court of Human Rights.240 Thus, individuals in Europe can rely 
on this multilateral treaty to have their rights protected and enforced in 
an international tribunal, and subsequently, in domestic tribunals that 
follow the European Court’s directive.241 
 Furthermore, European individuals and corporate non-state actors 
have other newly created rights stemming from a variety of EU Regula-
tions and Directives, which offer protection on many levels, including 
antitrust, labor, insurance, and health.242 Thus, the globalization trend 
in international law that has been transforming the world seems to 
have particularly embedded itself in Europe. In the United States, the 
trend seems weaker; nonetheless, U.S. courts appear at least more will-
ing to consider international protectionist norms and their impact on 
individual rights.243 
 Individual expectations and behavior have changed across the 
globe in light of the powerful influence of globalized international law, 
which has eroded state sovereignty in significant ways and granted the 
individual certain quasi-absolute rights and protections.244 The degree 
of protection afforded to the individual by modern-day international 
law may vary from region to region and country to country, but a core 
group of individual rights seem to have been firmly embedded in al-
most every nation’s legal culture, a phenomenon brought about by the 
potent forces of globalized international law. 
Conclusion 
 The powerful forces of globalization have transformed interna-
tional law through a process of evolution, which has had significant 
consequences on this legal field. Besides the proliferation of actors, 
processes, and sources in international law, this evolution has heavily 
impacted several legal fields, in particular human rights law, interna-
tional criminal law, and private international law. The evolutionary 
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process has also magnified the impact of international law, in its global-
ized shape and form, on state behavior and individual expectations. 
Although state powers and sovereignty seem to have been curtailed by 
this evolutionary process, by the same token, individual powers have 
been reinforced and reinvented through new transnational judicial 
norms and processes. How far the evolution of international law will 
take us remains uncertain, but it seems likely that international law will 
play a crucial role in the future life of both state and non-state entities, 
and that its study will require a truly elaborate approach.245 
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